I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly 90 percent of all water consumption in the Western U.S. occurs in irrigated agriculture, prompting the observation that modest transfers of water from rural to urban users could satisfy the growing nonagricultural demand for years to come (Howe, Lazo, and Weber 1990). However, in some Western states, including California, ruralto-urban transfers have been slow to take place ) despite a gradual recognition of the desirability of such transfers among policymakers . Smith (1989, 448) suggests that about 50 percent of irrigated acreage in the western U.S. is served by either a private mutual company or public water district. For irrigation from surface water, the figure is close to 100 percent. This fact makes these organizations key players in structuring water transfers and has prompted calls for analysis of their role in stimulating or obstructing rural-to-urban water transfers. The water district function of supplying the input water is closely parallel to the functions performed by cooperative and ABSTRACT. Water supply organizations control a large portion of agricultural water rights in the western U.S. This paper applies cooperative and club theory models to analyze the response of these organizations to potential rural-to-urban water transfers. Application of the models is to a proposed water trade between Southern California's Imperial Irrigation District and Metropolitan Water District. The analysis reveals that substantial intraorganizational conflict can emerge in response to specific transfer proposals, and this conflict may be sufficient to defeat or delay otherwise beneficial transfers. Poorly defined property rights and a failure to align these rights with operational control in the water supply organization are pinpointed as key sources of conflict. (JEL Q15)
Nearly 90 percent of all water consumption in the Western U.S. occurs in irrigated agriculture, prompting the observation that modest transfers of water from rural to urban users could satisfy the growing nonagricultural demand for years to come (Howe, Lazo, and Weber 1990). However, in some Western states, including California, ruralto-urban transfers have been slow to take place ) despite a gradual recognition of the desirability of such transfers among policymakers . Smith (1989, 448) suggests that about 50 percent of irrigated acreage in the western U.S. is served by either a private mutual company or public water district. For irrigation from surface water, the figure is close to 100 percent. This fact makes these organizations key players in structuring water transfers and has prompted calls for analysis of their role in stimulating or obstructing rural-to-urban water transfers. The water district function of supplying the input water is closely parallel to the functions performed by cooperative and club organizations ; Bain, Caves, and Margolis [BCM] 1966). This paper applies club theory and cooperative theory models to analyze decision making within a water supply organization regarding whether the organization will participate in water transfers.
The specific application is to the proposed water trade between the Imperial Irrigation District (IID) in southern California and the Metropolitan Water District (MWD), a wholesaler of water to uban areas of southern California. An analysis by estimated that economic gains with a capitalized value of $3 billion could be achieved if 1,090,000 ac. ft. of water were transferred annually from the Imperial Valley to urban users. Yet trade talks between IID and MWD languished throughout the 1980s before an agreement was eventually reached in 1989. The volume to be traded annually under the arrangement, 100,000 ac. ft., is less than 10 percent of the amount that could be traded profitably based on the Vaux and Howitt analysis.
Our analysis documents that substantial intraorganizational conflict can emerge within a water district in response to specific water trade proposals, and this conflict may be sufficient to defeat or delay proposed transfers that would otherwise yield substantial net benefits. Thus, although may be correct in their conclusion that water trading "may be one of the few policy changes in which all club organizations ; Bain, Caves, and Margolis [BCM] 1966). This paper applies club theory and cooperative theory models to analyze decision making within a water supply organization regarding whether the organization will participate in water transfers.
Our analysis documents that substantial intraorganizational conflict can emerge within a water district in response to specific water trade proposals, and this conflict may be sufficient to defeat or delay proposed transfers that would otherwise yield substantial net benefits. Thus, although may be correct in their conclusion that water trading "may be one of the few policy changes in which all participants can be gainers" (p. 791), the present analysis serves notice that these gains may not be realized under the typical proposals for structuring rural-to-urban transfers.
In the next section we describe structure and decision making in Western water supply organizations and explore their linkages to club and cooperative associations. Two contemporary models of decision making among heterogeneous cooperative members, one based on voting theory and the other on game theory, are summarized. The application of these models to the IID-MWD water trade negotiations then follows.
II. STRUCTURE AND DECISION MAKING IN WATER SUPPLY ORGANIZATIONS
This section focuses on water supply organizations with special reference to California. Public water supply organizations may differ in their structure across states and even within states for districts authorized under different enabling statutes. The most important public water supply organizations in California are reclamation districts, irrigation districts, water districts, and water storage districts ). Most western states followed California law in designing their own water statutes , and, therefore, much of this analysis should apply generally to western U.S. water supply organizations. ' Irrigation from a given source to a contiguous geographic area is supplied under conditions of increasing returns to scale (BCM 1966, ch. 6), and the provision of water for irrigation is, therefore, a natural monopoly. suggests the aggregate price elasticity of demand for irrigation water in 17 western states is about -0.35 and about -0.65 in California. These relatively inelastic demands indicate that a forprofit monopoly provider of irrigation water would have substantial market power. Businesses facing monopoly power have incentive to integrate upstream to avoid losses from monopolization by providing the monopolized input themselves (Sexton participants can be gainers" (p. 791), the present analysis serves notice that these gains may not be realized under the typical proposals for structuring rural-to-urban transfers.
This section focuses on water supply organizations with special reference to California. Public water supply organizations may differ in their structure across states and even within states for districts authorized under different enabling statutes. The most important public water supply organizations in California are reclamation districts, irrigation districts, water districts, and water storage districts ). Most western states followed California law in designing their own water statutes , and, therefore, much of this analysis should apply generally to western U.S. water supply organizations. ' Irrigation from a given source to a contiguous geographic area is supplied under conditions of increasing returns to scale (BCM 1966, ch. 6), and the provision of water for irrigation is, therefore, a natural monopoly. suggests the aggregate price elasticity of demand for irrigation water in 17 western states is about -0.35 and about -0.65 in California. These relatively inelastic demands indicate that a forprofit monopoly provider of irrigation water would have substantial market power. Businesses facing monopoly power have incentive to integrate upstream to avoid losses from monopolization by providing the monopolized input themselves ). In cases where the scale of operation upstream exceeds substantially the scale of the downstream firms, efficiency dictates that integration proceed jointly through a cooperative organization. These dual incentives for cooperative formation (market failure and economies of scale) were observed in the California water industry. Private irrigation companies with monopoly power, formed from 1870-1920, were gradually replaced by cooperative water supply organizations in the form of public water agencies or private mutual companies (BCM 1966, ch. 9).
Public water supply organizations in California are legally constituted governmental entities that are endowed with general corporate power and the power to assess property and tax their constituencies (Jamieson et al. 1974). In most cases they act as trustee for landowners within the district and are limited in this trust capacity to receive and distribute water to landowners. Financing in public water supply organizations may involve both per-unit charges for water deliveries, per acre water availability charges, and tax levies on land. Irrigation districts in California obtain most of their revenue from user charges. In the IID, for example, user charges have comprised between 92 and 96 percent of operating revenues during the 1980s (IID Annual Reports, 1980-89).
Most California irrigation districts including IID were organized under law which specifies that voting is on a oneperson one-vote basis, with eligible voters being all registered voters within the district. This universal franchise contrasts with the law specifying that the district as titleholder to the water rights must exercise that title for the equitable and beneficial interests of landowners ). However, enabling statutes for other California public water supply organizations restrict voting. In reclamation districts, water districts, and water storage districts voting rights are restricted to landowners, who 1986). In cases where the scale of operation upstream exceeds substantially the scale of the downstream firms, efficiency dictates that integration proceed jointly through a cooperative organization. These dual incentives for cooperative formation (market failure and economies of scale) were observed in the California water industry. Private irrigation companies with monopoly power, formed from 1870-1920, were gradually replaced by cooperative water supply organizations in the form of public water agencies or private mutual companies (BCM 1966, ch. 9).
Most California irrigation districts including IID were organized under law which specifies that voting is on a oneperson one-vote basis, with eligible voters being all registered voters within the district. This universal franchise contrasts with the law specifying that the district as titleholder to the water rights must exercise that title for the equitable and beneficial interests of landowners ). However, enabling statutes for other California public water supply organizations restrict voting. In reclamation districts, water districts, and water storage districts voting rights are restricted to landowners, who vote in proportion to the assessed valuation of their land. In water conservation districts one vote is allocated per acre of land.
The services provided by public water supply organizations can also be provided by mutual companies or private corporations.2 Hence, public water supply organizations are closely related to private clubs and specifically to agricultural cooperatives. Cooperatives often supply inputs such as fertilizers, seeds, petroleum, and chemicals to farmers. The water district function of supplying the input water is closely parallel, and the economic motivations for forming water supply organizations are very similar to those for forming an agricultural cooperative.
Four defining principles for a cooperative are as follows ):
1. Service at cost, 2. Benefits in proportion to use, 3. Member-user control, 4. Limited returns on equity capital.
Public water districts are organized as nonprofit corporations, and, thus, meet a necessary component of the service at cost principle.3 However, most districts do have the power to tax unimproved property. Unless the assessments levied bear a close relationship to the benefits derived from the district, a district's pricing will violate the service at cost principle. However, argues that both legal and economic theory support the use of property assessments to reasonably approximate the benefits received from irrigation.4 Mutual companies are also organized on a nonprofit basis and lack the power to tax and, thus, satisfy the service-at-cost principle.
Patrons of water districts receive benefits as users of water, not as owners of district resources. Benefits from water use are roughly proportional to the amount of water used and so the benefits in proportion to use principle is also met. The same conclusion holds for members of mutual water companies.
The principle of member-user control means that control in a cooperative is vested in members as users, not as owners. Most cooperatives base voting on a onevote in proportion to the assessed valuation of their land. In water conservation districts one vote is allocated per acre of land. The services provided by public water supply organizations can also be provided by mutual companies or private corporations.2 Hence, public water supply organizations are closely related to private clubs and specifically to agricultural cooperatives. Cooperatives often supply inputs such as fertilizers, seeds, petroleum, and chemicals to farmers. The water district function of supplying the input water is closely parallel, and the economic motivations for forming water supply organizations are very similar to those for forming an agricultural cooperative.
Patrons of water districts receive benefits as users of water, not as owners of district resources. Benefits from water use are roughly proportional to the amount of water used and so the benefits in proportion to use principle is also met. The same conclusion holds for members of mutual water companies. 4Efficiency in pricing requires that the input be priced to members at the marginal cost of its provision. When the input is provided under increasing returns to scale, as is the case for irrigation water, marginal cost pricing will result in a deficit. Thus, efficient pricing requires user charges based on marginal cost, and a fixed fee, such as a tax on land, set to satisfy the break-even requirement ).
5The equivalent of equity capital in a public water district is provided by their authority to issue bonds backed by their taxing capacity. Therefore, members provide funding for infrastructure development in this manner, but, unlike in the typical agricultural coopera- 4Efficiency in pricing requires that the input be priced to members at the marginal cost of its provision. When the input is provided under increasing returns to scale, as is the case for irrigation water, marginal cost pricing will result in a deficit. Thus, efficient pricing requires user charges based on marginal cost, and a fixed fee, such as a tax on land, set to satisfy the break-even requirement ).
5The equivalent of equity capital in a public water district is provided by their authority to issue bonds backed by their taxing capacity. Therefore, members provide funding for infrastructure development in this manner, but, unlike in the typical agricultural coopera-
III. MODELS OF DECISION MAKING IN COOPERATIVE ORGANIZATIONS
Recent research on cooperative organizations has emphasized the importance of heterogeneity among participants to the cooperative decision-making process. One approach uses median-voter decision theory to analyze the choice process within the organization ). An alternative approach, based on cooperative game theory, stresses that cooperation will not be undertaken unless it represents the best alternative available for the participating individuals and coalitions 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ID/MWD

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ID/MWD WATER TRADE
California's Imperial Irrigation District was formed in 1911. It consists of nearly 1.1 million acres with about 500,000 acres under cultivation. IID delivers water to about 6,900 farm accounts, 2,000 of which are owner operated, with the rest tenant operated. Most operators have more than one Loosely speaking, the core is more likely to be nonempty the greater are the gains to coalition building among the set of players in N. See Sorenson, Tschirhart, and Whinston (1978) and Sexton (1986) for a rigorous analysis of core existence conditions. 7A cross subsidy occurs when a subgroup within an organization receives a lower payoff from the organization than it could attain on its own. In the context of allocating costs, absence of cross subsidies is equivalent to no subgroup paying more than its "standalone" costs.
8This structure is implicit in the recent work by Saleth, Braden, and Eheart (1991) which explores use of multilateral bargaining rules to facilitate trade in thin spot water markets.
9Assembly bill 2090 has passed the California Assembly and is currently in committee at the Senate.
Loosely speaking, the core is more likely to be nonempty the greater are the gains to coalition building among the set of players in N. See Sorenson, Tschirhart, and Whinston (1978) and Sexton (1986) for a rigorous analysis of core existence conditions. 7A cross subsidy occurs when a subgroup within an organization receives a lower payoff from the organization than it could attain on its own. In the context of allocating costs, absence of cross subsidies is equivalent to no subgroup paying more than its "standalone" costs.
9Assembly bill 2090 has passed the California Assembly and is currently in committee at the Senate. The suggestion that IID and MWD negotiate a water transfer first was publicized by the Environmental Defense Fund (1983). A proposal was considered whereby MWD was to pay $10 million per year to IID to divert 100,000 ac. ft. of water. The funds were to be invested in conservation facilities by IID. Reaction in the Imperial Valley to the proposed transfer was negative, and the agreement was not ratified by the IID Board of Directors.
Communications continued between the two Districts, and a new agreement was ratified in December 1989. The volume to be traded remained at 100,000 ac. ft. per year. Payments to IID are to be $92 million over five years for irrigation system improvements in the IID, $23 million to offset indirect impacts of the project, and $3.2 million per year for maintenance, operations, and liability costs.
Thus, although IID and MWD eventually consummated an agreement, several aspects of the process deserve examination: the agreement occurred only after several years of wrangling, the volume to be traded is substantially less than the amounts that Vaux and Howitt (1984) have suggested could be profitably transferred, and all benefits accrue to members indirectly in terms of irrigation system investments rather than directly in terms of To limit the scope of the analysis, all of the alternative water trade policies considered here involve the annual transfer of 100,000 ac. ft. of water from IID to MWD. This volume was maintained consistently throughout discussions between IID and MWD and was the volume eventually agreed upon, although it is substantially less than the amount Vaux and Howitt (1984) concluded could be profitably traded. To investigate specifically the genesis of disagreement concerning the 1985 tentative sales agreement, we adopt the transfer price of $100 per acre foot specified therein.
We also use a scaled-down, representative model of IID to conform to the survey of IID farms. The survey included roughly one-eighth of the acreage and water use in IID. Therefore, prior to a trade we assume that the survey farms had entitlement to divert 358,000 ac. ft. of water with on-farm deliveries of 320,000 ac. ft. The volume of water to be traded annually associated with the survey farms is 12,500 ac. ft. . Under this plan water rights are apportioned among "The quadratic Leontief production technology developed from the PMP application captures farmers' shift of production mix to less irrigation intensive crops and the removal of land from production in response to higher water prices. It fails to capture any reductions in water application and associated reductions in yield or adoption of water-saving technologies. "The quadratic Leontief production technology developed from the PMP application captures farmers' shift of production mix to less irrigation intensive crops and the removal of land from production in response to higher water prices. It fails to capture any reductions in water application and associated reductions in yield or adoption of water-saving technologies. "The quadratic Leontief production technology developed from the PMP application captures farmers' shift of production mix to less irrigation intensive crops and the removal of land from production in response to higher water prices. It fails to capture any reductions in water application and associated reductions in yield or adoption of water-saving technologies. "The quadratic Leontief production technology developed from the PMP application captures farmers' shift of production mix to less irrigation intensive crops and the removal of land from production in response to higher water prices. It fails to capture any reductions in water application and associated reductions in yield or adoption of water-saving technologies. 1) 69(1) 69(1) 69(1) IID members on the basis of assessed valuation of land excluding improvements. The plan is analogous to a corporate tender offer and is designed to give District members tradeable rights, while remaining consistent with present State law specifying the district as title holder to the water. Under the plan the IID Board of Directors would offer to repurchase members' certificates at a per unit price consistent with the proposed sale to MWD. Members choose whether or not to tender their certificates. If certificates to more water than the proposed sale are tendered, purchases are prorated among those tendering certificates (Smith 1989, 453) . Water diversions to farmers would be reduced based on the number of certificates purchased from each farmer. Farmers, in turn, could react to reduced diversions by reducing irrigation intensity, idling land, or undertaking on-farm conservation.
69(
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It is straightforward to deduce that, if it is desirable for a member to tender any certificates, it is generally desirable to tender all of them.12 Therefore, in modelling Smith's plan we assume all certificates are tendered in response to the proposed trade, and, thus, that trade revenues are allocated to members in proportion to their land holdings.
The final policy considered was a composite of the negotiated-certificates and expand-the-resource policies. This policy, known as maintaining the resource, involved investment in conservation sufficient to maintain water deliveries at their pre-trade levels, with any remaining funds IID members on the basis of assessed valuation of land excluding improvements. The plan is analogous to a corporate tender offer and is designed to give District members tradeable rights, while remaining consistent with present State law specifying the district as title holder to the water. Under the plan the IID Board of Directors would offer to repurchase members' certificates at a per unit price consistent with the proposed sale to MWD. Members choose whether or not to tender their certificates. If certificates to more water than the proposed sale are tendered, purchases are prorated among those tendering certificates (Smith 1989, 453) . Water diversions to farmers would be reduced based on the number of certificates purchased from each farmer. Farmers, in turn, could react to reduced diversions by reducing irrigation intensity, idling land, or undertaking on-farm conservation.
The final policy considered was a composite of the negotiated-certificates and expand-the-resource policies. This policy, known as maintaining the resource, involved investment in conservation sufficient to maintain water deliveries at their pre-trade levels, with any remaining funds dispersed according to Smith's plan. This plan might be considered a political compromise between the expand-the-resource and negotiated-certificates plans.
The base price of water in the IID under limited entry was $7.50 per ac. ft. The per unit price under the other policies was computed to equate water demand with the available supply, with demand being computed from the scaled-down PMP model of the Imperial Valley aggregated from the 31 survey farms. Table 2 summarizes the estimated changes in water availability, price that equates supply with demand, and change in annual payoff for the survey farms from the alternative trade policies. Limited entry, of course, produces no payoff change. The negotiated certificates plan increases the annual payoff by X{iEN} Xi -2{iEN} V({i})-an estimated $1,233,527 ($1,250,000 in trade 12This conclusion can be verified by modeling member decisions concerning the tendering of certificates as a noncooperative game among district members. For example, consider a proposal to transfer Q* ac. ft. of water at price P* per ac. ft. Given water's marginal productivity in farming, each farmer can calculate how much water to transfer at P*. Let these amounts be qi(P*), i E N. Given typical price and sales levels in proposed rural-to-urban water transfers, ZNqi > Q*, and each farmer, if he tenders q, certificates, will sell less than his desired volume. The optimal strategy, thus, is to tender q* > qi. As farmers pursue this logic, the only Nash equilibrium is for each to tender all of his certificates. Actual certificates purchased are then prorated among members in proportion to the amount issued to each, a number proportional to the assessed value of unimproved land under Smith's plan. dispersed according to Smith's plan. This plan might be considered a political compromise between the expand-the-resource and negotiated-certificates plans.
The base price of water in the IID under limited entry was $7.50 per ac. ft. The per unit price under the other policies was computed to equate water demand with the available supply, with demand being computed from the scaled-down PMP model of the Imperial Valley aggregated from the 31 survey farms. Table 2 summarizes the estimated changes in water availability, price that equates supply with demand, and change in annual payoff for the survey farms from the alternative trade policies. Limited entry, of course, produces no payoff change. The negotiated certificates plan increases the annual payoff by X{iEN} Xi -2{iEN} V({i})-an estimated $1,233,527 ($1,250,000 in trade 12This conclusion can be verified by modeling member decisions concerning the tendering of certificates as a noncooperative game among district members. For example, consider a proposal to transfer Q* ac. ft. of water at price P* per ac. ft. Given water's marginal productivity in farming, each farmer can calculate how much water to transfer at P*. Let these amounts be qi(P*), i E N. Given typical price and sales levels in proposed rural-to-urban water transfers, ZNqi > Q*, and each farmer, if he tenders q, certificates, will sell less than his desired volume. The optimal strategy, thus, is to tender q* > qi. As farmers pursue this logic, the only Nash equilibrium is for each to tender all of his certificates. Actual certificates purchased are then prorated among members in proportion to the amount issued to each, a number proportional to the assessed value of unimproved land under Smith's plan. Although it generates the maximum overall benefit, Smith's negotiated-certificates policy actually reduces the payoff to 17 of the 31 survey farmers. The main reason is that revenues from tendering certificates under Smith's plan accrue to landowners in accord with State law. However, many of the survey farmers rent some or all of their land and, hence, their losses from higher water prices exceed any revenues they receive from tendering certificates.13 Five players are also estimated to lose from the expand-the-resource policy promulgated by the IID Board of Directors. This outcome results from the ensuing decrease in the market-clearing water price and the 13It is reasonable to expect that land rental rates would eventually adjust downward in response to higher water prices, and this effect would somewhat offset losses to renters. 13It is reasonable to expect that land rental rates would eventually adjust downward in response to higher water prices, and this effect would somewhat offset losses to renters. 13It is reasonable to expect that land rental rates would eventually adjust downward in response to higher water prices, and this effect would somewhat offset losses to renters. 13It is reasonable to expect that land rental rates would eventually adjust downward in response to higher water prices, and this effect would somewhat offset losses to renters. Land Economics   TABLE 3   CHANGE IN PAYOFFS TO IID MEMBERS UNDER  ALTERNATIVE WATER TRADE SCENARIOS   TABLE 3   CHANGE IN PAYOFFS TO IID MEMBERS UNDER  ALTERNATIVE WATER TRADE SCENARIOS   TABLE 3   CHANGE IN PAYOFFS TO IID MEMBERS UNDER  ALTERNATIVE WATER TRADE SCENARIOS The voting decision model is applied by simulating a series of pairwise votes among the four alternatives. The model yields a decisive winner: the policy of maintaining the resource is preferred on a vote of (20, 11) over negotiated certificates; (20, 11) over expanding the resource; and (31, 0) over limited entry. Thus, the "cycling" phenomenon discussed earlier is not observed in this context, and maintaining the resource is the Condorcet winner14 among the alternative policies despite the fact that it generates a lower total payoff than the policy of negotiated certificates. In fact, although it may seem paradoxical, negotiated certificates lose in every pairwise vote: (11, 20) with maintaining the resource; (14, 17) with expanding the resource; and (14, 17) with the no-trade option of limited entry. over limited entry. Thus, the "cycling" phenomenon discussed earlier is not observed in this context, and maintaining the resource is the Condorcet winner14 among the alternative policies despite the fact that it generates a lower total payoff than the policy of negotiated certificates. In fact, although it may seem paradoxical, negotiated certificates lose in every pairwise vote: (11, 20) with maintaining the resource; (14, 17) with expanding the resource; and (14, 17) with the no-trade option of limited entry. over limited entry. Thus, the "cycling" phenomenon discussed earlier is not observed in this context, and maintaining the resource is the Condorcet winner14 among the alternative policies despite the fact that it generates a lower total payoff than the policy of negotiated certificates. In fact, although it may seem paradoxical, negotiated certificates lose in every pairwise vote: (11, 20) with maintaining the resource; (14, 17) with expanding the resource; and (14, 17) with the no-trade option of limited entry. over limited entry. Thus, the "cycling" phenomenon discussed earlier is not observed in this context, and maintaining the resource is the Condorcet winner14 among the alternative policies despite the fact that it generates a lower total payoff than the policy of negotiated certificates. In fact, although it may seem paradoxical, negotiated certificates lose in every pairwise vote: (11, 20) with maintaining the resource; (14, 17) with expanding the resource; and (14, 17) with the no-trade option of limited entry. Therefore, the voting decision model suggests that Smith's proposed policy had little chance of emerging as the policy of choice in the Imperial Valley, despite the fact that it maximizes total payout from the water trade. The reason for negotiated certificates' comparative unpopularity again hinges on the owner-renter dichotomy. Absentee landowners are an important component of the property structure in the Imperial Valley and would benefit significantly from Smith's proposed policy, but under Irrigation District law, they have no vote in District matters.
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The game theory approach to cooperative decision making emphasizes that the majority may be limited in terms of the policies it can foist upon a minority. In particular, a minority can defect from a proposed coalition structure and payoff if its proposed payoff is less than the group can attain on its own outside the grand coalition. This intuition underpins the conditions defining a core allocation described earlier.
A complete cooperative game analysis of decision making in IID concerning the MWD water trade requires determining the capabilities of 2" -1 nonempty coalitions. Given that n = 31 generates over two billion unique coalitions, this task is unmanageable. The alternative pursued here is to consider four coalitions that might emerge naturally in response to considering alternative water trade possibilities. These coalitions are determined based on the payTherefore, the voting decision model suggests that Smith's proposed policy had little chance of emerging as the policy of choice in the Imperial Valley, despite the fact that it maximizes total payout from the water trade. The reason for negotiated certificates' comparative unpopularity again hinges on the owner-renter dichotomy. Absentee landowners are an important component of the property structure in the Imperial Valley and would benefit significantly from Smith's proposed policy, but under Irrigation District law, they have no vote in District matters.
A complete cooperative game analysis of decision making in IID concerning the MWD water trade requires determining the capabilities of 2" -1 nonempty coalitions. Given that n = 31 generates over two billion unique coalitions, this task is unmanageable. The alternative pursued here is to consider four coalitions that might emerge naturally in response to considering alternative water trade possibilities. These coalitions are determined based on the payoffs shown in Table 3 and are set forth in Table 4 along with the estimated change in payoff to each coalition from the alternative trade proposals relative to the baseline, limited entry case.
Coalition LO consists of the absentee landowners who benefit most from the negotiated-certificates policy but lack a direct say in District affairs. Coalition NC consists of the 11 farm operators identified in Table 3 who also prefer the policy of negotiated certificates. Coalition NC consists of operators who are landowners. Coalitions LO and NC are natural allies.
The coalition MR consists of the 9 players who prefer maintaining the resource. This group consists of farmers who own some land but mostly rent. This group tends to specialize in producing high-risk produce crops and earns higher operating profits per acre than the survey average. Coalition ER consists of the 11 players who prefer expanding the resource. This group consists almost exclusively of renters. From Table 4 coalitions MR and ER are also natural allies.
When coalition LO is included in N for the cooperative game, the payoff from negotiated certificates maximizes the total payout, {i,M xi = $1,234,000, among the alternatives under consideration. All other proposed policies, including maintaining the resource, as shown in Table 4 , do not satisfy the group optimality requirement, [3], for a core allocation. However, nearly offs shown in Table 3 and are set forth in Table 4 along with the estimated change in payoff to each coalition from the alternative trade proposals relative to the baseline, limited entry case.
When coalition LO is included in N for the cooperative game, the payoff from negotiated certificates maximizes the total payout, {i,M xi = $1,234,000, among the alternatives under consideration. All other proposed policies, including maintaining the resource, as shown in Table 4 , do not satisfy the group optimality requirement, [3], for a core allocation. However, nearly two-thirds of the total payoff from negotiated certificates goes to coalition LO, whose members lack a direct say in the operation of the IID. Does the policy of maintaining the resource generate a core allocation for the game excluding absentee landowners? Considering N to consist only of the union of the coalitions NC, MR, and ER, we can review the core requirements. From Table  4 , the policy maximizing the payout is now maintaining the resource, which generates a total annual payout to the group of $452,000 compared to $426,000 under negotiated certificates. Condition [3] is, thus, satisfied for the policy of maintaining the resource.
Assume that coalitions are able to defect from IID and preserve proportional shares of the District's water rights as well as utilize the existing canal structure.15 Separate water districts in the Imperial Valley would incur duplicate fixed costs for management. The portion of duplicate costs associated with the survey farmers was estimated to be about $250,000 per year.16 Table 5 analyzes the hypothetical situation where coalition NC breaks away from the aggregate district (now consisting of the natural allies, coalitions MR and ER) and is able to retain its proportional share of water rights. Both groups are assumed to participate in the water market, with NC disbursing trade revenues via negotiated two-thirds of the total payoff from negotiated certificates goes to coalition LO, whose members lack a direct say in the operation of the IID. Does the policy of maintaining the resource generate a core allocation for the game excluding absentee landowners? Considering N to consist only of the union of the coalitions NC, MR, and ER, we can review the core requirements. From Table  4 , the policy maximizing the payout is now maintaining the resource, which generates a total annual payout to the group of $452,000 compared to $426,000 under negotiated certificates. Condition [3] is, thus, satisfied for the policy of maintaining the resource.
Assume that coalitions are able to defect from IID and preserve proportional shares of the District's water rights as well as utilize the existing canal structure.15 Separate water districts in the Imperial Valley would incur duplicate fixed costs for management. The portion of duplicate costs associated with the survey farmers was estimated to be about $250,000 per year.16 Table 5 analyzes the hypothetical situation where coalition NC breaks away from the aggregate district (now consisting of the natural allies, coalitions MR and ER) and is able to retain its proportional share of water rights. Both groups are assumed to participate in the water market, with NC disbursing trade revenues via negotiated certificates and MR U ER choosing the policy of maintaining the resource. As a component of IID, NC was estimated to receive a total annual payout of $6.63 million from farming and membership in the aggregate district based on a maintaining-theresource policy. It is estimated to be able to obtain $6.66 million on its own, if it retains proportional rights to water. Thus, certificates and MR U ER choosing the policy of maintaining the resource. As a component of IID, NC was estimated to receive a total annual payout of $6.63 million from farming and membership in the aggregate district based on a maintaining-theresource policy. It is estimated to be able to obtain $6.66 million on its own, if it retains proportional rights to water. Thus, certificates and MR U ER choosing the policy of maintaining the resource. As a component of IID, NC was estimated to receive a total annual payout of $6.63 million from farming and membership in the aggregate district based on a maintaining-theresource policy. It is estimated to be able to obtain $6.66 million on its own, if it retains proportional rights to water. Thus, certificates and MR U ER choosing the policy of maintaining the resource. As a component of IID, NC was estimated to receive a total annual payout of $6.63 million from farming and membership in the aggregate district based on a maintaining-theresource policy. It is estimated to be able to obtain $6.66 million on its own, if it retains proportional rights to water. Thus, '6Analysis of data generated by BCM (1966) suggests that management costs are roughly 10% of total district costs. The portion of total district costs associated with the survey farmers is about $2.5 million, thus yielding the $250,000 duplicate costs estimate.
[6] iEMR U ER and MR U ER lack a credible threat to defect against a negotiated-certificates plan.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This analysis has pinpointed the conflict that may emerge within rural water supply organizations concerning possible ruralurban water transfers. It also confirmed the large gains to trade between IID and MWD suggested earlier by but documented that much of these gains will be dissipated through uneconomic conservation investments under the adopted policy of expanding the resource. As such, farmers in the Imperial Valley are left with little incentive to support a transfer, helping to explain the protracted delays in reaching a trade agreement and that the eventual agreement transfers only a small fraction of the water estimated to be profitably transferable.
California law governing public water supply organizations is responsible for much of the intransigence concerning water transfers. It specifies that water-supply districts hold water rights as trustees for the benefit of landowners, but control in many of these organizations, based on oneperson one-vote, is in the hands of renteroperators. This situation introduces a landowner-renter conflict. Renters in general are able to derive little direct benefit from water transfers and, therefore, tend to favor transfer policies mandating conservation projects that insure a continued supply of cheap water. In one-person one-vote districts like IID where the incidence of land rental is high, these preferences may hold sway.
However, District-level conservation policies were estimated to be uneconomic given current use values for water. Even with flows reduced in the IID by the 100,000 ac. ft. transfer to MWD, water's value of marginal product was estimated to be $8.90 per ac. ft., considerably less than the $16 per ac. ft. cost of the cheapest Xi > V(MR U ER), [6] iEMR U ER and MR U ER lack a credible threat to defect against a negotiated-certificates plan.
However, District-level conservation policies were estimated to be uneconomic given current use values for water. Even with flows reduced in the IID by the 100,000 ac. ft. transfer to MWD, water's value of marginal product was estimated to be $8.90 per ac. ft., considerably less than the $16 per ac. ft. cost of the cheapest district-level conservation initiative.'7 Preferred alternatives are growing less waterintensive crops, on-farm conservation, or idling land. Under Smith's (1989) negotiated certificates proposal, landowners would have incentive to undertake these actions. Passage of the bill currently pending at the California legislature would, by giving farmers specific water rights, facilitate transfers of the type proposed by Smith.
Alternatively, if voting in IID were based on land ownership or assessed value, the support for a negotiated-certificates plan would be overwhelming. Some commentators, however, have been critical of departures from one-person one-vote systems in public water districts ). Our view is that, if landowners are to be the beneficiaries of district-controlled water rights, economic efficiency is likely to be served if voting control is, in fact, vested in the landowners.
We believe that the game theory and voting theory models adapted to water supply organizations in this paper should be viewed as complements in structuring water transfers and analyzing behavior in water supply organizations. Because membership is compulsory in most public water supply organizations and decisions are based formally on voting power, voting theory models can perform a useful predictive role when multiple proposals are under consideration. The use of cooperative game theory and the core to define subsidy-free allocations can aid in defining "fair" trade policies and, in turn, limiting opposition to proposed transfers.
Our application of these methods suggests that the failure of public water districts to articulate well-defined property district-level conservation initiative.'7 Preferred alternatives are growing less waterintensive crops, on-farm conservation, or idling land. Under Smith's (1989) negotiated certificates proposal, landowners would have incentive to undertake these actions. Passage of the bill currently pending at the California legislature would, by giving farmers specific water rights, facilitate transfers of the type proposed by Smith.
Our application of these methods suggests that the failure of public water districts to articulate well-defined property rights and to align control with those rights is detrimental to the emergence of water markets. Water is effectively a common property resource in public water districts, and farmers lack incentives to idle land or invest in on-farm conservation. The result is to introduce a perverse "tragedy-of-thecommons" effect into the water market calculus. Instead of under-investment in the common property water delivery system, the outcome in the Imperial Valley is to overinvest in the system to the point where, based on Table 2 , 95 percent of the potential gain from trade is dissipated. Dissipation of the gains to a water transfer, in turn, reduces incentives to participate in transfers, explaining at least in part the infrequency of rural-to-urban water transfers in California.
In sum, most analysts and policymakers agree that rural-to-urban water transfers need to be expanded. This study suggests that policy reforms are needed to facilitate these transfers. Vesting power in individuals versus organizations is needed to introduce appropriate incentives into water transfer decisions. Such empowerment includes clarifying and strengthening the property rights of individuals and aligning voting control in water supply organizations with property rights. In this proposed environment the water district performs a less active role that is closely related to the functions of a traditional agricultural cooperative, including exploiting economies of size, insuring efficient delivery of water, and providing a vehicle through which members can collectively bargain terms of water transfers.
Admittedly, enactment of these reforms raises an additional set of issues associated with expanded water transfers including water quality concerns, possible recapture of windfall gains, and effects on third parties. These considerations transcend the boundaries of individual water supply organizations and, hence, must also be addressed through the legislative process as part of a comprehensive reform package to facilitate both efficient and equitable water transfers. rights and to align control with those rights is detrimental to the emergence of water markets. Water is effectively a common property resource in public water districts, and farmers lack incentives to idle land or invest in on-farm conservation. The result is to introduce a perverse "tragedy-of-thecommons" effect into the water market calculus. Instead of under-investment in the common property water delivery system, the outcome in the Imperial Valley is to overinvest in the system to the point where, based on Table 2 , 95 percent of the potential gain from trade is dissipated. Dissipation of the gains to a water transfer, in turn, reduces incentives to participate in transfers, explaining at least in part the infrequency of rural-to-urban water transfers in California.
Admittedly, enactment of these reforms raises an additional set of issues associated with expanded water transfers including water quality concerns, possible recapture of windfall gains, and effects on third parties. These considerations transcend the boundaries of individual water supply organizations and, hence, must also be addressed through the legislative process as part of a comprehensive reform package to facilitate both efficient and equitable water transfers.
